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INTRODUCTION 
 Myriad identified two genes that exist in every 
person.  It did not create, invent, or design the genes 
by “isolating” them.  Its patents claim products and 
laws of nature and thus are invalid under Section 
101. 
Myriad does not dispute that BRCA gene 
fragments appear in the body, with covalent bonds 
broken and separated from material such as 
chromatin with which they are normally associated.  
Resp’ts Br. 51-52.  It has thus essentially abandoned 
any defense of the insignificant structural differences 
asserted by the Federal Circuit majority. In addition, 
although Myriad emphasizes the use of genes as 
probes and primers, it concedes that the claims are 
not limited to probes or primers.  Id. at 8, 42.  What 
remain are Myriad’s arguments that it extracted the 
genes from the body and added to the storehouse of 
knowledge. The first would not distinguish patenting 
a gene from patenting a kidney.  The second is 
precisely rejected by the law or product of nature 
doctrine. 
 Myriad dismisses this Court’s product and law 
of nature doctrine. It expands the Section 101 inquiry 
by repeatedly asserting that the difficulty of the task 
and the value of the result are relevant 
considerations. It contracts the inquiry by asserting 
that factors considered by this Court, such as 
whether what is patented has markedly different 
characteristics or preempts use of laws and products 
of nature, are irrelevant. Myriad also improperly 
places heavy reliance on the PTO’s practice of 
granting gene patents. None of Myriad's arguments 
comports with this Court's precedents. 
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 The assertions of Myriad’s amici largely rest 
on the fear that a ruling in Petitioners’ favor might 
prevent useful patents on tests, drugs, other DNA-
related compositions such as recombinant DNA, or 
patents limited to particular uses.  See, e.g., Br. for 
Amici Curiae Genentech, Inc. et al. in Support of 
Resp’ts, Mar. 14, 2013  (“Genentech Br.”).  This case 
does not challenge the patent-eligibility of 
recombinant DNA (DNA that results from choosing 
fragments from genes or chromosomes that do not 
appear together in nature and stitching them 
together), recombinant therapeutic proteins, or 
genetically engineered antibodies.  These patents are 
on naturally-occurring genes. 
 Finally, Myriad argues again that the case 
should be dismissed based on standing.  That effort 
should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
I.   ISOLATED DNA IS A PRODUCT AND 
LAW OF NATURE, NOT AN INVENTION. 
A.   DNA 
 Myriad has used four different arguments to 
explain why it believes “isolated” DNA is not a 
product or law of nature but instead its invention:   
isolated DNA has a different structure than DNA in 
the body, isolated DNA has a new function, isolated 
DNA is the result of extraction, and patents on 
isolated DNA add to scientific knowledge.  None is 
persuasive; none establishes that Myriad designed, 
created, or invented the DNA. 
 Different Structure From DNA Found In 
Nature.  Myriad argues that “isolated” DNA has a 
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different structure from DNA in the body.  Resp’ts 
Br. 44.  Myriad concedes that isolated DNA has the 
same nucleotides in the same order as genomic DNA 
and that isolated DNA conveys the same information 
and represents the same laws of nature as genomic 
DNA.  Id. at 41.  Myriad offers no specific structural 
alteration other than to refer to the structural 
differences identified by the Federal Circuit; i.e., that 
in separating a gene from its chromosome, a covalent 
bond is broken. Id. at 42. Petitioners and amici have 
established that fragments of the BRCA genes with 
covalent bonds broken do exist in nature.  Pet’rs Br. 
10-11; Br. for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in 
Support of Neither Party 12-18, Jan. 31, 2013 
(“Lander Br.”). Myriad does not dispute that.  Resp’ts 
Br. 51-52.  Because Myriad offers no other structural 
distinctions between “isolated” DNA and DNA, it has 
effectively conceded that none exists. 
 New Function.  Myriad argues that “isolated” 
DNA can perform functions that DNA cannot 
perform.1 Myriad is in effect arguing that it may 
obtain a patent on a product or law of nature itself if 
it finds a new use for it.  Under this theory, Section 
101 would not prohibit someone from obtaining a 
patent on gold if she found a new use for gold.  As a 
matter of law, that argument is incorrect. Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
 If one finds a new use for a product of nature, 
one may seek a method patent on that new use.  
Myriad, in fact, has claims to DNA for particular 
uses.  E.g., 2J.A. 823 (claim 16 of patent ‘282 on use 
                                                 
1 Resp’ts Br. 7, 8, 35, 41-44. 
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of DNA as primer). Petitioners have not challenged 
those claims and the validity of such claims is not 
before the Court. The claims in this case are to the 
product of nature itself and not limited to any single 
use. 
 Myriad relies heavily on an argument that the 
patented genes acquire new functionality because 
they could potentially be used as probes or primers.2  
However, Myriad concedes that full-length genes, 
which are unquestionably included within its claims, 
cannot be used as primers. Resp’ts Br. 42. And 
Myriad concedes that none of the challenged claims 
is limited to the use of the DNA as a probe or primer, 
but instead reach any use. Id. at 8, 42. Thus, 
Myriad’s alleged new functionalities do not justify 
the patent claim.3 
 Extraction.4 Myriad argues that “isolated” 
DNA is different from DNA because it has been 
                                                 
2 The district court provided clear definitions of probes and 
primers.  Pet. App. 264a-65a. 
3 Myriad only briefly alludes to its use of “isolated” DNA for 
purposes of diagnosis, perhaps because diagnosis is impossible 
if the isolated DNA is not identical to the DNA in the body.  
Moreover, “isolated DNA,” standing alone, cannot diagnose 
cancer risk, Resp’ts Br. 42, n.12 – many more steps must be 
taken. 
4 Like the district court, petitioners use the term “extraction” 
rather than the term “isolation.”  Pet. App. 263a.  Myriad has 
often used the term “isolation” to include both separation of the 
gene from the chromosome and also removal from the body.  As 
noted above, Myriad did not refute that separation of the gene 
from the chromosome and other material such as chromatin 
does not distinguish “isolated” DNA from DNA.  Accordingly, 
the only portion of the term “isolation” that is left is extraction 
from the body.  
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extracted from the body.  Under this theory, Hans 
Dehmelt, who won the Nobel Prize for being the first 
to isolate a single electron from an atom, could have 
patented the electron itself.  A kidney removed from 
the body (or gold extracted from a stream) would be 
patentable subject matter.  Myriad’s only response is 
to say that a kidney is an “organ” and DNA is not an 
“organ.”  Resp’ts Br. 56.  But that distinction has no 
legal bearing.  For the reasons stated more fully in 
Petitioners’ opening brief, Pet’rs Br. 26-48, Myriad’s 
patent claims to isolated DNA cover products and 
laws of nature and are therefore invalid.  
Myriad’s argument also fails to acknowledge 
that scientists have been extracting genes, including 
BRCA1 and BRCA2, from the body and other matter 
since at least the 1970’s. Lander Br. 8 n.4 (explaining 
how fragments of the entire genome were extracted 
and collected).   
Adding to the Storehouse of Knowledge. The 
only remaining argument that could support 
Myriad’s patents is that Myriad added valuable 
information to the storehouse of knowledge. The 
cornerstone of the Section 101 doctrine, however, is 
that adding to the storehouse of knowledge is an 
insufficient basis for receiving a patent.  Funk Bros. 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301-02. Thus, the fact that 
Myriad scientifically annotated the genome by 
locating the particular nucleotides that form the 
BRCA genes does not satisfy Section 101.   
Although Myriad claims an invention, the 
words it uses to most commonly describe its 
accomplishment are not about invention.  The verbs 
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Myriad uses to describe its work are “identify,” 5 
“define,”6 “locate,”7 or “characterize.”8 Einstein 
“identified,” “defined,” and “characterized” the 
relationship between matter and energy, but his 
discovery was not patentable. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). An 
astronomer who “identifies” or “locates” a new object 
in space and then “defines” or “characterizes” it as a 
comet has not turned that comet into her invention.  
The first scientists to isolate lithium from its 
naturally-occurring metallic form were not entitled to 
a patent on an element of the periodic table.  Pet. 
App. 104a-05a.   
B.   The Expansiveness of Myriad’s 
Claims Is Evidence of Their 
Ineligibility Under Section 101. 
 Myriad argues that a patent claim’s scope is 
only relevant to the written description requirement 
of Section 112.  But claim scope is directly relevant to 
many of the requirements of the Patent Act, 
including Sections 101, 102, and 103. 
Myriad’s claims reach the genes of every 
woman, man, and child in America.  The moment 
any person’s BRCA gene is removed, Myriad has 
exclusive rights to it even if Myriad never previously 
isolated DNA having that sequence and did not and 
could not know its sequence.  The claims are 
expansive precisely because their bounds are defined 
                                                 
5 Resp’ts Br. 2, 6, 34, 38, 45. 
6 Id. at 2, 6, 7, 34, 38, 41, 43. 
7 Id. at 6. 
8 Id. at 34, 41, 42, 45. 
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by nature.  The common link among the hundreds of 
millions of different compositions that are claimed is 
that they occur in nature and serve the functions 
dictated by nature.  Likewise, the claims to any DNA 
coding for the BRCA protein and over any mutation 
that causes cancer are defined by nature.  These are 
not claims written to specify particular DNA or 
cDNA that is used as a primer or probe to target 
particular genetic mutations, or that has been 
changed to produce a therapeutic protein.  They are 
claims to products and laws of nature.  
C.   cDNA 
1.  The patent-eligibility of cDNA is not 
at issue in this case. 
This case should be resolved without reaching 
the patent-eligibility of cDNA, because none of the 
claims is limited to only cDNA.  For the first time, 
Myriad argues that some of its claims are so limited.  
Resp’ts Br. 11. This argument is inconsistent with 
the patents’ language. The patents define DNA as 
used in the claims to include both DNA and cDNA.  
See, e.g., Patent ‘282, 19:14-18, 19:51-53, 2J.A. 755. 
Myriad argues that the compositions it now 
claims are limited to cDNA differ from genomic DNA 
because cDNA is “synthesized in laboratories and 
exclude certain regulatory and other non-protein-
coding sequences (introns) found in native DNA and 
include only protein-coding DNA (exons).”  Resp’ts 
Br. 12. Petitioners do not dispute that cDNA has 
these attributes; however, Myriad did not limit the 
cited claim (or any of the challenged claims here) to 
such attributes.  In addition, the claims use the term 
“has” (“…wherein said DNA has the nucleotide 
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sequence…”). That term has a specialized meaning in 
patent law, generally interpreted to mean “including 
but not limited to.” U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 
2111.03, at 2100-45 (8th ed. Rev. 9 2012) (citing 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 
F.3d 1559, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the 
expansive meaning of the term to cDNA)). 
Myriad attempts, nonetheless, to limit claim 2 
of the ‘282 patent, 2J.A. 822, to these attributes by 
citing the “wherein” clause which references the 
sequence.  Resp’ts. Br. 12. The “wherein” clause, 
however, does not reference any descriptive text 
adjoining the sequence.  Thus, the only proper 
construction of claim 2 is that it covers “isolated DNA 
[with] the nucleotide sequence set forth.” This 
language does not limit the claim to cDNA and 
covers any DNA that has the sequence given. To 
analogize, assume the patent claim at issue was to 
“an automobile of the color in figure X,” which depicts 
a truck with red paint.  Myriad would argue that the 
claim is limited to trucks with red paint, but the 
claim references only the color set forth in figure X, 
not the automobile type. If Myriad wanted to claim 
cDNA with the sequence that is described, it could 
(and should) have claimed “the cDNA molecule with 
the sequence…” 
Finally, Myriad argues that claim 6 of the ‘282 
patent, 2J.A. 822, is limited to cDNA.  Resp’ts Br. 12.  
But claim 6 covers any nucleotide sequence 
containing 15 or more nucleotides from SEQ. ID 
NO:1, and 15 nucleotide (and longer) sequences from 
SEQ. ID NO:1 are found throughout genomic DNA.  
1J.A. 631-34, 662-72; Pet. App. 114a-16a. See also 
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Jeffrey Rosenfeld & Christopher E. Mason, Pervasive 
Sequence Patents Cover the Entire Human Genome, 5 
Genome Med. 27 (2013) (showing that 15-nucleotide 
sequences of BRCA1 match at least 689 other genes, 
that all human genes contain at least one patented 
15-nucleotide sequence, and that current gene 
patents cover at least 41% of all known genes). To 
argue that claim 6 is limited to cDNA is simply to 
ignore its plain language and the facts. 
2.   If the Court concludes it must reach 
the issue of the patent-eligibility of 
cDNA, it should find cDNA 
unpatentable. 
 Myriad argues that because cDNA is generally 
made in a laboratory, it is patent-eligible. Resp’ts Br. 
6-7. Petitioners anticipated and responded to this 
flawed argument.  Pet’rs Br. 51-52.   
 The DNA that Myriad asserts is cDNA 
contains the identical genetic sequence as the coding 
regions in the naturally-occurring DNA of every 
person. 2J.A.755. The key difference between 
genomic DNA and cDNA is that the latter is 
complementary to natural mRNA, wherein the body 
has removed the non-coding regions.  That removal 
occurs in the body by natural processes.  Myriad has 
nothing to do with it.  Pet’rs Br. 49-50. 
 In the laboratory, Myriad takes naturally-
occurring mRNA from the body and simply relies on 
the natural binding properties of nucleotides to 
assemble the DNA. Id. Imagine the mRNA as 
magnets positively charged by nature. All that 
humans do is to add magnets negatively charged by 
nature (ordinary nucleotides). The nucleotide’s 
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natural properties cause them to link and the result 
is called cDNA.9   
cDNA is quite distinct from recombinant DNA, 
which is created when a geneticist selects cDNA or 
DNA fragments from different sources and 
intentionally stitches them together.  Lander Br. 20.  
Any therapeutic application of cDNA requires further 
altering cDNA to create recombinant DNA.  Id.  But 
cDNA that simply mirrors naturally-occurring 
mRNA is a product of nature and a basic scientific 
tool; preempting its use impedes innovation.  See 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.   
II.   MYRIAD ATTEMPTS TO SALVAGE ITS 
CLAIMS  BY DISTORTING THE LEGAL 
STANDARD APPLICABLE TO SECTION 
101, IN VIOLATION OF THIS COURT’S 
PRECEDENTS. 
Myriad offers its own more expansive legal 
standard for Section 101:  whether the composition is 
a result of “human intervention,” emphasizing the 
degree of effort involved and the value of the 
products and laws of nature uncovered.  Myriad also 
seeks to minimize factors identified by this Court 
such as preemption. Finally, Myriad deems 
dispositive that the Patent Office has approved of the 
compositions at issue.  Resp’ts Br. 34, 49-50.  Each of 
these arguments ignores, and in some instances 
rejects, the principles laid out in the Court’s most 
relevant cases. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289; 
                                                 
9 The binding properties of nucleotides are not magnetic, but 
the qualities are analogous.  It is thus inaccurate to say that 
Myriad “designed” or “created” either DNA or cDNA.  Resp’ts 
Br. 6, 34. 
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Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127; 
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 
U.S. 1 (1931).   
A. Invention Under Section 101 
Cannot Be Reduced To Mere 
“Human Intervention.” 
In deciding whether a patent is valid under 
Section 101, the Court has not simply asked whether 
humans were involved in the purported invention, 
but instead examined the characteristics of what was 
patented and the extent to which the patent 
preempts use of a product or law of nature.  Mayo, 
132 S. Ct. at 1294; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-10; 
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129-32; American Fruit 
Growers, 283 U.S. at 11-13. The Court has 
scrutinized whether the underlying product or law of 
nature has been transformed into something with a 
“distinctive name, character [and] use,” and 
“markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature.”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10. 
Myriad nonetheless argues that “markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature” is 
not part of the legal analysis, Resp’ts Br. 40.  
Compare with Pet. App. 50a, 76a, 107a. Myriad 
further asserts that the Section 101 inquiry must 
focus on whether there are any differences between 
the patented composition and nature, no matter how 
overwhelming the similarities may be.  Resp’ts Br. 
40.  As discussed in Section I, supra, the “differences” 
referred to by Myriad are unsupported by science or 
unspecified in the challenged patent claims.  In any 
case, the Section 101 inquiry has never been limited 
in the manner Myriad now proposes. Under Myriad’s 
view, the Court would have upheld the patents on 
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the American Fruit Growers fruit and the Funk 
Brothers bacteria; both were in some small measure 
different from the fruit and bacteria strains as they 
existed prior to the patentee’s activity, but both were 
deemed unpatentable subject matter. 
Instead of applying the Court’s precedents, 
Myriad attempts to reduce the analysis to mere 
human intervention or human ingenuity. Defying 
more than 150 years of case law, Myriad states:  “It 
is more judicious to determine patent-eligibility 
based on the presence of human ingenuity, rather 
than focus myopically on whether a natural law or 
product was somewhere involved.” Resp’ts Br. 33.10  
But Section 101, as enforced by this Court, requires 
more than human ingenuity or intervention to 
establish patent-eligibility.   
The electron, gold, and lithium examples 
illustrate this point:  patent-eligibility does not rest 
on the difficulty or cost of defining the composition or 
on its value. See Parker v. Flook, 437 US 584, 593 
(1978) (Section 101 determination must precede 
novelty and utility inquiries). Myriad highlights the 
praise it received after sequencing BRCA1 and 
BRCA2. Resp’ts Br. 5-6, 56-57.11 The discovery 
                                                 
10 Myriad compounds its error by misconstruing Chakrabarty’s 
partial quotation of legislative history, Resp’ts Br. 16, without 
acknowledging that Congress clearly recognized the statutory 
limitations to patent-eligibility:  “A person may have ‘invented’ 
a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under 
the sun made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under 
Section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.”  H.R. 
Rep. No.1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).     
11 Myriad fails to give due credit to the ground-breaking work of 
Dr. Mary-Claire King and her team, who identified the locus of 
the BRCA1 gene and similarly received wide acclaim. Kevin 
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deserves praise, but patents are not granted based on 
recognition, costs, or hard work.  Incorporating such 
considerations into Section 101 would eviscerate this 
Court’s long-standing precedent. Many compositions 
resulting from serious investment, such as drugs and 
new genetic technologies, deserve patent protection, 
but that is because they represent true inventions 
and not because resources were poured into their 
development.   
B. Myriad’s Patents Preempt Uses Of 
Laws And Products Of Nature. 
The Court has made clear that patents cannot 
preempt all uses of any laws or products of nature or 
abstract ideas without running afoul of Section 101.  
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3225; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313; Funk Bros., 333 
U.S. at 130-31; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113-18 
(1853); Pet. Br. 40. The “preemption of nature” 
inquiry unearths the extent to which the patent 
interferes with using a law or product of nature. 
Myriad minimizes the relevance of preemption, even 
though “[t]he Court has repeatedly emphasized this 
last mentioned concern, a concern that patent law 
not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up 
the future use of laws of nature.”  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 
1301.   
                                                                                                    
Davies & Michael White, Breakthrough: The Race to Find the 
Breast Cancer Gene 2-6 (1996). The gene “came to be known as 
the ‘BRCA1 gene,’” Resp’ts Br. 6, because Dr. King named it so. 
Others made significant contributions as well.  See, e.g., 
Kenneth J. Abel et al., A Radiation Hybrid Map of the BRCA1 
Region of Chromosome 17q12-q21, 17 Genomics 632 (1993). 
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All of the evidence presented in this case 
supports the conclusion that Myriad’s patents 
preclude others’ use of laws and products of nature.  
Because DNA must be isolated in order for clinicians 
and researchers to use the gene and the information 
it contains, the patents stop others from basic 
scientific activity.  The patents are the reason why no 
other laboratory in the U.S. can conduct full 
sequencing of these genes, even using testing 
methods other than the one employed by Myriad.  
E.g., Pet. App. 37a.  The patents have been decried 
by famed geneticists like declarant John Sulston and 
amici James Watson and Eric Lander, all leaders of 
the Human Genome Project.  See 1J.A. 129-40; Br. of 
James D. Watson Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party 19, Jan. 31, 2013 (“Watson Br.”) (“A 
human genome cluttered with no trespassing signs 
granted by the Patent Office inhibits scientific 
progress, particularly the development of useful tests 
and medicines in areas requiring multiple human 
genes”); Lander Br. 25 (these “claims erect an 
insurmountable barrier to studying these DNA 
sequences, with serious consequences for innovation 
in medicine”). They stand in the way of genetic 
testing companies like amici GeneDx and InVitae, 
which are among the many laboratories developing 
new technologies for sequencing human genes.  E.g., 
Br. of GeneDx and Law Professors as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Pet’rs, Jan. 30, 2013; Br. of Amicus 
Curiae InVitae Corp. in Support of Pet’rs, Jan. 31, 
2013. And they pose a serious barrier to 
developments in personalized medicine that could 
benefit us all.  E.g., Br. of Amici Curiae Am. Medical 
Ass’n et al. in Support of Pet’rs, Jan. 29, 2013 (“AMA 
Br.”); Br. for Canavan Foundation et al. as Amici 
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Curiae in Support of Pet’rs, Jan. 31, 2013 (“Canavan 
Br.”); Br. of AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Pet’rs, Jan. 31, 2013 (“AARP Br.”). 
Myriad attempts to refute this point by 
focusing on how it chooses to enforce its patents, not 
on the rights granted through the patents. Thus, it 
claims that because it has not enforced its patents 
against some scientists who engaged in research 
relating to the BRCA genes, there is no preemptive 
effect.  Resp’ts Br. 48. Myriad may well decide not to 
sue certain researchers, particularly when their work 
may further knowledge about the genes and thus 
increase the value of Myriad’s genetic testing 
services. But Myriad’s argument ignores the 
authority it has and the documented chilling effect 
these patents have had as they influenced scientists’ 
decisions about where to focus their work.  1J.A. 162-
66, 219-24, 715-18; AARP Br. 3-6; Watson Br. 14, 16-
22; Rosenfeld & Mason, supra at 5. 
Myriad similarly asserts that whole genome 
sequencing or other sequencing methods would not 
violate its patents. That argument ignores the 
definition of “isolation” in its patents or as construed 
by the lower courts. Whole genome sequencing 
requires fragmenting DNA, including breaking its 
covalent bonds. Michael L. Metzker, Sequencing 
Technologies – The Next Generation, 11 Nature 
Reviews 31 (2010).  The technician will inevitably 
“isolate” the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as she 
sequences the entire genome. Myriad cannot sidestep 
the fact that whole genome sequencing would violate 
its patents by claiming it would not enforce them 
against those testing methods (or not enforce it so 
long as the results are not shared with a patient, a 
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condition it has placed on researchers, e.g., 1J.A. 59, 
164, 171, 173, 186-97).  Cf. Robert L. Green et al., 
Am. Coll. Med. Genetics, ACMG Recommendations 
for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical 
Exome and Genome Sequencing 13, 25 (2013) 
(recommending that laboratories disclose BRCA 
genetic information when obtained incidentally 
through genome sequencing). The forbearance 
Myriad has expressed in this litigation offers no 
protection to any laboratory that wants to provide 
BRCA results as a part of a whole genome clinical 
assay. Similarly, Myriad refers to other testing 
methods that do not sequence DNA at all, but 
instead measure other biological phenomena such as 
gene expression. Because they do not involve the 
natural phenomena at issue here – a patient’s BRCA 
genetic sequence – their existence is irrelevant to 
whether the patents preempt laws and products of 
nature. 
C. PTO Practice Does Not Provide The 
Legal Framework To Decide The 
Question Presented. 
Myriad further departs from this Court’s 
precedent by arguing that PTO practice should be 
“an independent reason” to uphold patents under 
Section 101.  Resp’ts Br. 28.  PTO practice, however, 
has never been a decisive factor in determining 
patent-eligibility.  See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304-
05 (disapproving patents granted by PTO); 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306 (upholding patents 
rejected by PTO).  Indeed, the PTO routinely granted 
patents similar to the ones this Court found invalid 
in Mayo. Following this Court’s ruling, the PTO 
issued two guidance documents to its examiners to 
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inform them how Mayo should change their patent-
eligibility determinations. Andrew H. Hirshfeld, U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, Preliminary Guidance to 
Patent Examining Corps on Supreme Court Decision 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc. (2012); Andrew H. Hirshfeld, U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, Memo to Patent 
Examining Corps on 2012 Interim Procedure for 
Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of Process Claims 
Involving Laws of Nature (2012) (“Interim 
Procedure”). For example, the PTO noted that 
contrary to prior PTO practice, Mayo treated the 
correlation between metabolite levels, resulting from 
the administration of a drug, and drug efficacy as a 
law of nature.  Interim Procedure at 7, n.5.  The PTO 
further predicted that “[a]dditional guidance from 
the courts on how to identify laws of nature may be 
forthcoming in cases like Myriad.” Id. Thus, the PTO, 
industry, and relevant stakeholders understand and 
expect that the courts have an important role in 
resolving Section 101 questions. 
The legal framework for deciding patent 
eligibility is Section 101 and this Court’s precedents.  
As the United States explains in its brief, the PTO’s 
Utility Guidelines do not have the force of law.  U.S. 
Br. 27-28.  And contrary to Myriad’s representations, 
Resp’ts Br. 29, the PTO has never taken a blanket 
position approving the patent-eligibility of isolated 
natural products.  Indeed, the 1889 case of Ex Parte 
Latimer illustrates how the government recognized 
early on the dangers of allowing such patents.  1889 
Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123 (1889).  The Commissioner of 
Patents found that even though the fibers at issue 
were obtained by freeing them from the pine needle 
and removing extraneous matter, and thus made 
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more useful for mankind, they were not patentable.  
To rule otherwise would mean that “patents might be 
obtained upon the trees of the forest and the plants 
of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable 
and impossible.” Id. at 126.         
The issue of isolated DNA’s patent-eligibility 
was not presented before any court until this case.  
The lower court decisions cited by Myriad, Resp’ts 
Br. 4-5, did not involve Section 101 or dealt with 
purified (referring to concentrated) compositions that 
were transformed to serve new functions, such as 
triggering therapeutic response; the patents 
therefore did not preempt examining or measuring 
the product of nature itself.  Likewise, the legislative 
history that Myriad and its amici point to does not 
support upholding these patents. Congressional 
inaction on isolated DNA cannot support an 
inference that Congress endorsed the PTO’s practice 
of issuing these DNA patents. Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006) (plurality opinion); 
Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001).  Cf. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001) 
(referring to congressional enactment of legislation 
confirming that plants are patentable).12 
                                                 
12 Similarly, Myriad’s references to international law are 
inapposite. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) allows governments to exclude 
patents on the grounds of public interest, the patent systems in 
other countries vary widely, and most allow for greater research 
than is permitted in the U.S.. TRIPS, art. 27; Cancer Voices 
Australia v. Myriad Genetics Inc. (2013) FCA 65 (Austl.) (court 
decision based on Australian patent law, which is “quite 
different” from American law); 1J.A. 699-702.  Myriad does not 
have the same rights to BRCA in other countries.  See, e.g., 
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III.  A RULING FOR PETITIONERS WILL 
HAVE POSITIVE RESULTS FOR 
INDUSTRY AND PATIENTS. 
 This Court has frequently said that patents on 
products or laws of nature can have severely negative 
effects on the advancement of science. E.g., Mayo, 
132 S. Ct. at 1293 (“monopolization of those tools 
through the grant of a patent might tend to impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it”).  
There is ample support in the record for that 
conclusion with regard to DNA.  See, e.g., 1J.A. 695-
710; Pet’rs Br. 42-48. The claims also have had 
devastating effects on patients.  Pet’rs Br. 7-9.  See, 
e.g., AMA Br. 6-13; Lander Br. 23-26; 29; Canavan 
Br. 10-16.   
 Myriad’s amici do not seriously dispute these 
facts.  Instead, they voice concern that a ruling for 
Petitioners might prevent patents on things other 
than “isolated DNA.” For example, some fear that the 
Court’s decision might reach patents on recombinant 
DNA. See Genentech Br. 4-5.  Recombinant DNA is 
DNA in which the scientist has joined two or more 
DNA sequences that are not found together in nature 
in order to achieve certain effects.  The recombinant 
DNA sequence and function are designed by the 
scientist, as opposed to the DNA in this case, where 
both the sequence and function are determined by 
nature. As many of the amici acknowledge, 
                                                                                                    
1J.A. 136-37, 213-14; Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene 
Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of Commercial 
BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123, 143 (2002) (in Europe and 
Canada, Myriad was either unsuccessful in obtaining the broad 
rights granted in the U.S. or its patents were disregarded by 
the government).  
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recombinant DNA is the “invention” that enables the 
production of the novel proteins used to treat many 
diseases, and most economically valuable patents in 
the biotechnology industry are on recombinant DNA.  
See id. at 6-7; Lander Br. 20; Watson Br. 18, 21.   
A ruling for Petitioners in this case would not 
preclude patenting of recombinant DNA.  Petitioners’ 
arguments pertain only to “isolated DNA,” which is 
required to diagnose an individual’s own genetic 
susceptibility to cancer and other conditions.   
Indeed, Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents, 
particularly claims 5 and 6 of patent ‘282, 2J.A. 822, 
preclude all others from using BRCA1 or BRCA2 
fragments to create recombinant DNA. Thus, a 
ruling for Petitioners would not jeopardize patents on 
recombinant DNA and would in fact facilitate that 
option. 
Some of Myriad’s amici express concern about 
the ruling’s effects on the development of therapeutic 
drugs.  First, it should be noted that this case does 
not challenge patents on drugs. Myriad did not 
develop a new drug and did not go through FDA 
trials or approval prior to offering testing.  See 
Frederic M. Scherer, The Economics of Human Gene 
Patents, 77 Acad. Med. 1348, 1351-52 (2002) 
(biotechnology industry’s profits and expenses relate 
to drug sales and FDA approvals, not genetic 
testing).  Second, to the extent that amici argue that 
patenting isolated DNA was the first step toward 
their eventual development of drugs (and thus such 
patents must be upheld), the contention either seeks 
special treatment for biological products of nature, a 
proposition this Court recently rebuffed, or 
completely rejects the constitutional underpinnings 
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of the product and law of nature doctrine.  Mayo, 132 
S. Ct. at 1305. Locking up a product of nature such 
as two human genes through patents might very well 
benefit the patentholder, but at the expense of 
forcing the public to rely on a single entity to fully 
investigate the wide range of scientific, medical, and 
commercial potential for those genes.        
 To the extent Myriad or its amici are arguing 
that the patents in this case were necessary to create 
an incentive to search for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes or to commercialize a test for the genes, the 
record is clear that they were not. 1J.A. 244-60.   
Other scientists, including those who did not want 
patent exclusivity, were looking equally vigorously 
for the genes, id. at 136-38, 248-50, and other 
laboratories had begun testing for mutations until 
Myriad forced them to stop.  Pet. App. 21a-22a, 37a.  
Myriad’s monopoly on the BRCA genes has allowed it 
to dictate the quality and provision of BRCA genetic 
testing and to control the scientific knowledge about 
the genes, thereby limiting medical practice, chilling 
research, and restricting access to information 
crucial to women’s health.13  Patent protection at the 
                                                 
13 Myriad’s amici’s arguments that the claims’ harmful effects 
could be ameliorated are based on speculation, rather than the 
law, as evidenced by the enforcement of the BRCA patents.  
There is no compulsory licensing regime, and compulsory 
licenses have never been ordered following eBay, Inc.  v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  Similarly, the 
government has never exercised march-in rights over patents in 
which it has an interest.  And the “research exception” to patent 
infringement is extremely narrow. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 
F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting any activity in furtherance of 
“legitimate business,” regardless of profit motive, falls outside 
the exception). 
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level of the gene (versus on actual tests, recombinant 
DNA, etc.) is simply unnecessary to spur innovation 
in diagnostics.  Rep. of the Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on 
Genetics, Health, and Soc’y, Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices and their Impact on Patient 
Access to Genetic Tests 31 (Apr. 2010). In other 
contexts, gene patents have interfered with the 
availability of testing.  AMA Br. 10.   
A ruling for Petitioners in this case would not 
preclude patenting of recombinant DNA, new drugs, 
or new methods of diagnosis and/or treatment.  
Instead, it would ensure that human genes – the 
blueprint for human biology – can be accessed by all 
scientists and medical professionals working in 
diagnostics, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and 
other fields.14     
IV.   PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING. 
 For the fifth time in this case, Myriad argues 
that Dr. Ostrer does not have standing.  Resp’ts Br. 
17-22.  The Federal Circuit formally rejected the 
argument three times.  Pet. App. 25a, n. 6, 32a, 40a-
42a.  In twice granting the Petition in this case, this 
Court at least implied that it found the argument 
unpersuasive.  The Court should reject it. 
 The Federal Circuit specifically found that: 
 Myriad threated to sue Dr. Ostrer.  Id. at 
33a-34a. 
                                                 
14 As noted, Petitioners have not challenged claims limited to 
the use of DNA as a probe or primer.  Section I, supra.  
Similarly, Petitioners have not challenged claims limited to 
diagnostic kits.  See, e.g., 2J.A. 823, cl. 18. 
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 Dr. Ostrer seeks to engage in infringing 
activities, id. at 32a-33a, and Dr. Ostrer 
“states unequivocally that he will 
immediately begin such testing . . .”  Id. at 
36a. 
 Dr. Ostrer “has the resources and expertise 
to immediately undertake clinical BRCA 
testing. . .”  Id. at 35a-36a. 
 “Myriad’s active enforcement of its patent 
rights forced Dr. Ostrer, as well as every 
other similarly situated researcher and 
institution to cease performing the 
challenged BRCA testing services . . .”  Id. 
at 37a. 
 “[T]he relevant circumstances surrounding 
Myriad’s assertion of its patent rights have 
not changed despite the passage of time,” 
id. at 36a, “Myriad and Ostrer have not 
altered their respective positions,” id. at 
37a, and “nothing in the record suggests 
that any researcher or institution has 
successfully attempted to compete with 
Myriad, or that Myriad has in any way 
changed its position with regard to its 
patent rights.”  Id. at 37a. 
 Given these facts, Dr. Ostrer clearly has 
standing. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118 (2007).  Myriad’s argument – that no one 
has standing unless Myriad has recently and 
personally threatened them with suit for 
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infringement – is inconsistent with this Court’s 
standing jurisprudence.  See Cert. Pet. 32-35.15 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the patent claims 
should be held invalid.   
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15 The Federal Circuit did find that the other petitioners lacked 
standing, Pet. App. 41a, and this Court denied certiorari on that 
issue.    
